Faith-based organisations and changing landscapes of welfare provision
Over the last three decades faith-based organisations (FBOs) have become increasingly prominent in welfare provision and political activism in the UK (as elsewhere), and their growing infl uence has been widely charted (see, for example, Cairns et al, 2005; Dinham, 2009; Dinham et al, 2009; Farnell et al, 2003; Furbey and Macey, 2005; Jochum et al, 2007; Lowndes and Chapman, 2005) . FBO activity occurs at national, regional, and local levels and embraces a range of welfare arenas, including support for children and youth, the elderly, homeless people, and asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, and a range of welfare activities relating to housing, poverty and debt, disability, and community regeneration (Cloke et al, 2009 ). Such activity is by no means simply a recent phenomenon (see Harris, 1995; Prochaska, 2006) ; indeed the contemporary activities of some FBOs such as the Salvation Army are founded on a long history of service dating back to Victorian times. However, three aspects of the recent resurgence of FBOs in responding to urban social issues tend to contradict any interpretation that this phenomenon is simply a return to charity of former times. First, faith-motivated activity in this area is not exclusively charitable, and encompasses diverse practices of social engagement within and between the realms of service provision, capacity building, and political campaigning. Second, the increasingly multicultural and ethnic plurality of the UK means faith-based social action is no longer limited to the Protestant, or indeed Christian, faith but also extends to a range of non-Christian and non-Western faiths. Third, dramatic contextual changes in welfare policy, governance, and statevoluntary relations tethered to the long-drawn-out processes of Enlightenment and secularisation have relegated religion to a position largely subservient to the state. Unsurprisingly, both the consolidation of the welfare state, and its subsequent shrinkage and partial deconstruction, have transformed the terrain upon which faith-motivated actors and organisations have engaged in social and political action.
The contemporary reorganisation of the welfare state has typically been regarded as a by-product of neoliberalism (Beaumont 2008a; Peck and Tickell 2002) , and has been marked by the opening up of a renewed role for faith-motivated groups in the public realm. Neoliberal governance over this period has led to shrinkage of public sector service provision and a greater propensity to contract out service delivery, and FBOs appear to be inextricably interconnected with these trends as they have expanded their welfare activities in order to fill the gap. In this way faith-motivated Third Sector organisations have been represented as merely being incorporated into the wider governmentalities of neoliberal politics so as to allow less expensive forms of government (Hackworth, 2010a (Hackworth, , 2010b Peck and Tickell, 2002; Trudeau and Veronis, 2009 ). However, there has been a recent insistence that these processes of neoliberalism need to be understood in conjunction with transformations within secularism amid an ever-growing realisation of radically plural societies in terms of religion, faith, and belief (see Beaumont, 2008b Beaumont, , 2010 Beaumont and Dias, 2008; Cloke et al, 2010; Molendijk et al, 2010) . Here, the idea of the postsecular has been deployed to help understand why religion (referring both to religious actors and to organisations) seems to be achieving an increased presence and visibility within the public sphere of secularised late-modern capitalism (Beaumont, 2010; Beaumont and Baker, 2011; Cloke, 2010; Cloke and Beaumont, forthcoming) . In one sense the postsecular can be seen to represent a shift i the state s se ula ist self-u de sta di g De V ies, , page ; see also Be kfo d, ; Bretherton, 2010; Davie 2007) , that is permitting a more-easily-accepted enlistment of FBOs in government-led partnerships. It follows that this shift can be interpreted as nothing more than the domestication and secularisation of religion, in line with prevailing political economic understandings of how the state co-opts voluntary and faith-based organisations into its programmes of rule. FBOs are in essence viewed as willing or unwilling participants in the hollowing out of the welfare state (Goode, 2006; Hackworth, 2009; 2010a; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Trudeau and Veronis, 2009; ) , and their politics can be assumed to be either entirely in keeping with, or subjugated to reflect, neoliberal values, or indeed an ambiguous mix of the two (Beaumont, 2004; Connolly, 2005; Davis, 2006; LyonCallo, 2008; Peck, 2006) .
However, ideas relating to the postsecular have also been developed in a more ethical and philosophical register, recog isi g e oppo tu ities fo app o he e t et ee p e iousl separate (and often oppositional) religious, humanist, and secularist interests, in order to work together towards common goals for social justice (Cloke, 2010) . Following this lead, in this paper we take issue with the lines of association that are commonly drawn in contemporary social science between neoliberalism, faith, and postsecularism. Following Gibson-G aha s p a ti e of eadi g fo diffe e e athe tha do i a e , page xi), we argue that neoliberalism is being coconstituted by the involvement of FBOs and other similar agencies, whose locally situated and ethically flavoured activities and agency is able to shape, as well as be shaped by, the grander-scale rationalities of governance. Moreover, we raise the possibility that the involvement of FBOs in the local-scale technologies deployed in pursuit of these top-down rationalities can serve to subvert, resist, and rework the performative assemblage of neoliberalism. In this way the activities of FBOs can be read as coproducing neoliberal forms, rather than being produced by them. In what follows, using an illustration of a particular FBO in the UK, we critique how the concept of neoliberalism is theorised a d put to o k in accounts of voluntary sector co-option, recognising instead the need to attend to the different manifestations of secularism and religion, and their connections to changing politicaleconomic and social contexts. We conclude by developing the case for more a careful analysis of the co-constitution of neoliberalism, by examining a number of specific convergence points where FBOs have directly or indirectly helped coproduce neoliberal forms. Within some of these forms we consider how FBOs could be read as offering paths of resistance against neoliberalism, deliberately resisting government partnership in order to pursue alternative philosophies of care and to meet the needs of those ineligible for state support and/or to engage in political activism.
2 The eoli eral orthodo : FBOs as little platoo s i ser i e of eoli eral goals?
The prevalent social science narrative of the role and significance of FBOs typically positions them as willing or unwilling victims, and in some cases collaborators (Goode, 2006; Hackworth, 2009; 2010a; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Peck, 2006) , caught up in the neoliberal incorporation of voluntary resources to occupy the vacuum of welfare space left behind by retreating central and local state activity (Billis and Harris, 1992; Bondi, 2005; Deakin, 1996; Fyfe, 2005; Fyfe and Milligan, 2003a; 2003b; Harris, 1995; Owen and Kearns, 2006; Wolch, 1990 It is hard to deny that over the last thirty years roll-out neoliberal governance has opened up opportunities for FBOs to take up high-profile roles in public service delivery: for example, in education, homelessness, community regeneration, and health care (Harris et al, 2003 (Barnes, 2006; Billis and Harris, 1992; 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Harris, 1995; 1998; Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Salamon and Anheier, 1996; Wolch, 1990) .
The Ne La ou go e e t s poli ies of joi ed-up governance and partnership with the Third Sector certainly assisted this trend (Buckingham, 2009; Carmel and Harlock, 2008; May et al, 2005 and of the need for the state to act strongly to ensure issues of quality control and policy direction.
Accordingly, since 2001 there has been a greater recognition of the contribution faith groups bring to the public sphere (DCLG, 2008a; 2008b; Dinham, 2009; Edwards, 2008; Harris et al 2003; Home Office, 2004; LGA, 2002) , especially in terms of their heightened role in urban policy and regeneration (Cairns et al, 2005; Taylor, 2003 The elfa e-to-o k o o kfa e se to has ee a ke a e a i hi h the go e i g of eoli e al subjectivities via the Third Sector has been recognised in the UK as elsewhere (Dean, 2007) .
Organisations involved in providing employment training and advice have inevitably been swept up in broader analyses of a neoliberal moralisation of the poor, and deemed to be incorporated in the wider task of imposing appropriate behaviour on unemployed people through strict motivational requirements and motivational engineering (McDonald and Marston, 2005 Pathways To Work and Big Lottery schemes were unsuccessful. As a consequence, several of its services had to be closed and some sixty staff were lost, although it currently retains around forty staff and a similar number of volunteers. In some ways, Pathways has once again shrunk down to its core foci-preparing young people and new immigrants for employment and meeting the needs of the hard-to-reach long-term unemployed, although it has also become involved in new specialist services for ex-offenders and providing Foodbank services. It would be all too easy to regard Pathways as a typical case of how an FBO becomes incorporated into neoliberal governance, as a little platoon first co-opted into the ideology and practice of workfare in such a way as to lose its faith-motivated identity, and then spat out by that same governmental machine when fiscal restrictions led to public sector spending cuts, not only in major welfare programmes but also in smaller-scale local authority support for Third Sector activity. However, we want to present three lines of argument to suggest that the characterization of FBOs as little platoons co-opted by the state into a shadow state apparatus that dictates a hegemonic neoliberal modus operandi within the Third Sector (Wolch, 1990; 2006) represents a rather lopsided analytical conclusion.
Contesting the idea of neoliberal co-option of FBOs
Our first challenge to the idea that FBOs serve as little platoons in the service of neoliberal governance stems from the emerging critique of oversimplified conceptualisations of changing governmentality.
It has been emphasised elsewhere (see for example Barnes and Prior, 2009; Barnett, 2005; 2009; Barnett et al, 2008; Conradson, 2008; May et al, 2005 ) that neoliberalism is not best understood as a static end-game, or as a framework that is somehow parachuted, top-down, so as to transform different spatial-temporal contexts. Rather, we can conceive of a more dynamic process of eoli e alisatio B e e a d Theodore, 2002; Springer, 2010) , presenting neoliberalism as a fabrication, co-constituted in contingent, often contradictory, assemblages and alliances, and as prone to subversion in various sites and spaces (Barnett, 2009 ). Rather than a seemingly monolithic force out the e that effo tlessl ep odu es itself, e og isi g eoli e alis -as-assemblage 4 helps to trace the specific set of resonances, the precarious maintenance work required to make durable these convergences, and the mundane, hybrid, and mutating processes that lead to different variegations of neoliberalism. Crucially, for critical geographers willing to trace the precarious and messy fabrication of neoliberal forms and practices, this approach renders neoliberalism and its processes of reproduction inherently fragile and open to contestation (Larner, 2003) . Accordingly, we want to argue that neoliberalism, as a political project and a mode of governmentality, has at least in part become assembled through particular configurations of religion and the secular, and that these coconstitutional practices can lead to contestation as well as incorporation.
In conceptual terms, therefore, we want to issue two cautions about the framing of FBO activity through the analytic of roll-out neoliberalism. The first concerns the way the concept of hegemonythe notion that power subordinates through the production and maintenance of consent-has been applied to the analysis of neoliberal discourses, technologies, and subjectivities, particularly in 4 "ee Co oll s i te p etatio of Deleuze s iti ue of apitalis as a io ati , o p isi g u e ous coexisting entanglements with dense tangles and loose ends, where each element is not reducible to others. accounts of governmental alignment and capture of faith-based and voluntary organisations in service of neoliberal goals. This analytical approach uncritically overstates the ways governmental targets, objects, and organisational cultures are automatically realised, normalised, and internalised in the day-to-day workings of FBOs. In doing so it ignores the complex and often contradictory negotiation work needed to maintain, reproduce, and contest these regimes of practices, and thus effectively renders invisible a significant arena of subversion and resistance within the trappings of neoliberal governance (Barnes and Prior, 2009). The second concerns the more general employment of neoliberalism as an analytical and explanatory framework. We want to argue there is a need to examine the contextual underpinnings of the revalorisation of faith groups as public actors; otherwise we are left with a reified account of neoliberalism as an all-persuasive process acting independently to reconfigure the welfare landscape (Barnett, 2005; 2009; Barnett et al, 2008; Larner, 2000; Springer, 2010) . By attending to the co-constitution of religion, secularism, and neoliberalism, as well as questioning issues of power, agency, and subversion within neoliberal systems of governance, ideological explanations of state retrenchment and Third Sector incorporation can be made sensitive to the ways neoliberalism is itself a performative assemblage, relying on mundane processes and practices (Larner, 2003) .
A particular problem here has been the combination of neo-Marxian perspectives on statehood and political-economic restructuring with post-Foucauldian accounts of governmentality that stress selfregulation and the micro-conduct of populations (see Barnett, 2005) . This analytical fusion has been deplo ed to u pa k the p e ise e ha is s that gi e e t al state autho ities the ea h a d apa ilit to stee the a ti ities of lo al i stitutio s Ma Lea , , page , de o st ati g ho top-do go e e t p og a es eoli e alise e o o ies, institutions, and subjects on the ground, through mundane processes of calculation, self-regulation and subjectification. However, the congruity of these analytic perspectives has been disputed (Barnett, 2009; Barnett et al, 2008; Pykett et al, 2010) , especially in the context of welfare restructuring and Third Sector incorporation (Bondi Neoliberalism as a political rationality refers to a specific form of organising the political sphere, governance practices, and citizenship (Brown, 2006) in which there is an explicit imposition of a particular form of market rationality on the noneconomic spheres. A key concern here is the apparent effortlessness with which particular programmes of government are assumed to be neoliberal, and particular processes are accepted as the product of neoliberal ideology. The social sphere is often only considered as a contextual factor shaping the variability of neoliberalisation; an arena of reaction deemed relevant in accounts of welfare restructuring only insofar as it is the object of state administration in the interests of economic efficiency. In this way, investigation of Third Sector o ga isatio s su h as FBOs le ds itself to kind of cookie-cutter typification or explanation, a tendency to identify any program with neo-elements as essentially neo-li e al 'ose et al, , pages -98).
Conradson (2008) specifically warns against this temptation to interpret FBOs solely through the conceptual lens of pseudo-governmental normalisation and neoliberal subjectification, calling instead for closer empirical scrutiny of the organisational and ethical precepts that have helped reform faithbased practices from charity to social and skills development. In this way, what appears as right-ofcentre neoliberalism may actually turn out to be something rather different, connected to a rediscovery of theological precepts of wholeness, justice, and human dignity:
A ke ele e t of this analysis, for present purposes, is the notion that charitable endeavour has the potential to become complicit in the maintenance of client deprivation. One might detect apparent echoes of right-of-centre arguments about service-induced dependency here, perhaps suggesting a degree of organisational capture by the wider neo-liberal social policy culture. However, interviews with staff instead suggested that this position was derived from a social work emphasis on client empowerment and various strains of liberation theology. This left-of-centre mix of thought was informing a particular evolution in the Missio s p a ti e of olu ta elfa e p o isio Co adso , , page .
We therefore need to be critically hesitant before prematurely labelling discourses of welfare depe de , espo si ilit , a d e po e e t as i t i si all eoli e al , a d e ight i stead analyse the disparate streams of rationality that produce fundamentally different landscapes of political intelligibility and possibility in different social milieux.
Equally it seems important to question any assumption that top-down governmental rationalities have an inherent strategic intentionality that somehow automatically produces neoliberal subjects. Barnett et al (2008) have argued that political rationalities do not entail at any stage of production a singular logic, but rather invoke multiple and contested rationalities that are negotiated, made durable, and disseminated in praxis (also see Barnett, 2009 ). It follows that we need to focus less on what particular actors want to happen, and more on how plans are played out in a field of contestation against other a to s ith thei o a ts see Li, . I othe o ds, i te tio s-even the intentions of powerful actors-are simply the most visible aspect of much larger and more complex mechanisms through which outcomes are produced, reproduced, and transformed (Li, 2007) . Rationalities, then, are co-constituted through praxis, and it cannot necessarily be assumed even if we can accept governmental intentions as neoliberal that these intentions will not be resisted and transformed, rather than slavishly followed, by actors such as FBOs. Accordingly, analyses that simply picture FBOs as wearing the cloak of neoliberalism are prone to turn a blind eye to how FBOs may seek to refashion the garment and its cloth because of the theo-ethical attributes (see Cloke, 2010) of their motivation that serve to co-constitute the nature and practice of their participation. demonstrates that some FBOs remain as outsiders to government policy, using voluntary resources to fulfil advisory and caring roles that are not nested within joined-up local servicing. Some of these outside o ga isatio s pu sue philosophies a d o je ti es of a e hi h o t a e e the state s insistence on responsible neoliberal subject-citizenship. This factor can clearly be seen in the provision by FBOs of soup runs for on-street homeless people, thereby serving people on-the-street when government policy is infatuated by target-driven reductions in on-street forms of homelessness (see
Johnsen et al, 2005).
Secondly, although it is sometimes assumed that insider FBOs subjugate their faith motivation to the frameworks of governance that envelop them, it has been demonstrated that the incorporation of faith-motivated activity can enable subtle but significant shifts in moral and ethical politics from within. In some cases these shifts will arise from the way in which care and service are performatively brought into being by staff and volunteers, creating both a localised fragrance of care that can deviate from professionalised uniformity, and a groundswell of experience which at national levels can cumulatively stand in countercultural opposition to the edicts of neoliberalism (see Cloke et al, 2009; Conradson, 2003) . For example, government regeneration initiatives such as Local Strategic
Partnerships seek out local community representatives, congregations, and FBOs as prospective pa t e s u de a p ag ati a d i st u e tal atio ale to a ess ha d-to-ea h people fo ho decades of government social policy have failed. In our research with FBOs across the country, one spokesman of a prominent mosque in London that receives various funds from different governmental departments and philanthropic organisations to deliver health access, education, and employment programmes, stated that within funding contracts:
The e is o p essu e to ate do the faith ele e t. The faith-based ethic is central to the way projects are run-faith is crucial, it is a useful tool to inspire people, for example, getting the parents to encourage their children to go to school-if the Imam goes to talk to them it would hold a lot more weight because he is a pillar of the community, he is respected by the parents; and similarly, for all the people trying to find work, if there is a faith-based element a out h the should fi d o k, a d the e s a eligious aspe t su ou di g it, the the ll e o e i li ed to e o e p oa ti e i t i g to fi d so ethi g a d doi g so e o k.
This would seem to present evidence both that governments are often content to tap into FBO networks, and that, where necessary, the faith ethos performed within these networks can be left unchallenged by this apparently insider status. Here) have been active in mobilising public concern around counterhegemonic rationalities of the poor, and translating these concerns into feasible policy alternatives. In each of these three ways, it seems inadequate to understand FBO activity simply in terms of an clients, and if they were to continue this work anyway they might as well receive financial support from the government to do so and expand the scope of their services.
However, this critical pragmatism was implemented according to a significant organisational ethos and performed in alignment with a strong ethical commitment between staff and clients, such that Pathways staff can be seen as subverting the ethical rationalities of welfare-to-work in their delivery of the programme. For example, the organisational ethos of Pathways was founded on the precept that unemployed clients are not idle or feckless but rather circumstantially disadvantaged from lack of education or training which has had consequences on their job opportunities and motivation.
Path a s as the efo e set up to add ess the hole pe so to gi e the the full ess of life (interview with a previous manager of Pathways, 2 October 2010. The founding churches never intended this approach to be directly evangelistic or proselytising; rather they designed Pathways to e a ehi le fo lo al hu hes to help edu e u e plo e t as pa t of thei e p essio of faith i p a ti e . The do i a t theo-ethi al isio that a ates the o ga isatio s social action is that it is uildi g the Ki gdo of God p edo i a tl helpi g people o e o e the a ie s to e plo e t a d ha e a o e a u da t life e t a t f o Path a s e site . This app oa h i ol es f eei g people from oppression in all its fo s so ial, e o o i , ph si al a d spi itual , heali g a damaged sense of self-o th, se u it a d feeli gs of sig ifi a e , a d o i g i to a li i g elatio ship ith Jesus . I fa t, the o ga isatio as iti al of o e t displa s of p osel tisation, instead hoping clients develop an understanding of the Christian faith by seeing faith-in-action through the attitudes and performances of staff. Great emphasis is laid by the organisation on staff behaviour and values to ensure no one is discriminated agai st: all people e se e a e to e ei e respect, value, love, care, patience, positive feedback, encouragement, integrity, individual atte tio .
We want to suggest that these theologically inspired ethical approaches have challenged the as those considered eligible by government targets. In this way, people from whom the state had withdrawn statutory support (asylum seekers, single homeless people, and so on) came to benefit from government-funded programmes. Indeed, neoliberal welfare-to-work programmes are often iti ised as he pi ki g o ea i g the ost ualified u e plo ed i to jo s hile a gi alisi g the long-term unemployed who are hardest to help. In contrast, as the Pathways manager told us:
O e of the halle ges the go e e t fa es is fle i ilit , a d that s e ha d o a atio al le el, ut it is he e lo al o ga isatio s a e, espo si e to lo al eeds, a d that s hat is ulti atel e e o e s eeds a e diffe e t, pa ti ula l he ou a e o ki g ith people with complex backgrounds, environments and needs-have a number of barriers to integration to mainstream society. For someone who has just been made redundant from the banksthe e got thei stuff i o de , all the eed is a othe jo . The a be easily processed and find something. Compare that to someone who has never worked-third or fourth generation unemployed -has a whole load of other things going on. You need to get alongside that pe so o e ti e a d uild t ust, uild elatio ship-the pe so ill sa ok I goi g to t a d do so ethi g diffe e t he e. A d it s that g oup of people ho go e e t a e t i g to ea h ut a t. I e hea d i iste s sa the fo us is o those ho ha e just lost jo s a k i to employment, so the hardest to reach are just pushed further away from the labour market.
The ui k tu a ou d of getti g people a k i to o k should t e at the e lusio of othe s othe ise ou e just sto i g up p o le s fo ou self fiftee ea s do the li e i te ie with current Pathways manager, 9 July 2009).
I this a , Path a s ethi a e des i ed as life-fi st app oa h to elfa e-to-work: an approach that ould pla e a pe so s life-needs, including their need to work, before their duty or obligation to take paid e plo e t see also Dea , , page ; Dea et al, .
Supposedly neoliberal technologies of workfare-characterised by compulsion, sanctions, strict monitoring of targets, and putting the onus on the recipients to find jobs-were also subverted within the operations of Pathways. Although interviewees were keen to position themselves legally as fulfilling the necessary requirements and target criteria of contracts, they were adamant that in its everyday practices and performances the organisation reworked the expected values and practices of welfare-to-work in order to provide a far more person-centred experience for clients compared with the job centre. As a previous manager explains:
Out o es e a e eall i po ta t i those pa ti ula fu di g egimes, when we did accept contracts we worked very hard to both achieve the outcomes but also be very frank about who we were and how we presented ourselves in applying for those contracts, but also working with people on the coalface as it were, we still remained a very strong Christian ethos.
So even though we might have changed the way we did things on the ground as it were, we worked, I suppose, possibly in a slightly subversive way in the sense of, not being dishonest, ut sa i g, e ll take the o e ut e put i uite a lot of e t a o k hi h as t e ui ed of us from the contracts we took, so with a large number of volunteers involved and staff
doing more than what they really needed to. We managed to maintain an ethos on the ground that is person-centred but at the same time reached the level of outcomes required by our fu di g egi es i te ie ith a p e ious a age of Path a s, O to e .
The ethos a d app oa h of Path a s egs to diffe f o the sta k us a d the e talit that tends to be institutionalised in job centres and reinforced through fixed appointments with case workers, and the threat of sanctions and surveillance. Indeed, we can suggest this to be an emergent space of resistance, where the apparent incorporation into the rationalities and technologies of workfare can more accurately be regarded as a deliberate co-constitution of alternative ethical performances within the overall framework which are capable of subverting the regressive nature of that framework. The revision that takes place occurs through the theo-ethical prompting of extraordinary performances of care that involves a going-beyond-the-call-of-duty by staff and volunteers:
The e s so ethi g a out staff goi g e o d the all of dut , goi g a ou d o the weekends a d e e i gs to people s ho es, just to suppo t the , ou k o , goi g shoppi g fo a outfit
for a job interview -actually going to the job interview with them, sitting outside, giving them confidence and reassuring them there is someone there and they can ask questions if they need to. Other things like that we are not paid to do but staff are doing it and are trying to find ways of working that in, so there is also a real sense as a faith-based organisation, or
Christian organisation, I passionatel do t elie e that this o ld is it -that is one of the principles in which we operate, we have clients from all sorts of backgrounds, religions, faiths, whatever leaning, we respect everyone for their own independent choices and positions that is central to how we operate, we operate in a multicultural multi-faith environment with our lie ts a d espe ti g that is e t al othe ise the ould t o e a k i te ie ith current Pathways manager, 9 July 2009).
Other interviewees recounted stories of goi g-beyond-the-self that i luded sha i g eals togethe ,
remembering birthdays, babysitting, giving informal advice and support, taking people to interviews, and buying a travel pass, going around their house on the weekend and helping them with DIY.
Although this theo-ethical praxis is played out within the contractual environment of the New Deal, the e a t e t of su h ethi s i gs a o side a le halle ge to the apitalist e sio of e o o i s that edu e people to u its a d the so ialit that developed reciprocal ethical commitments between staff and clients ga e people [ lie ts] a eal se se of hope that life ould e diffe e t … . I k o that [pe so al relationships] makes a difference and I know that is understood and appreciated by our clients. The environment in which people come into here is often commented on by lie ts-the see so ethi g diffe e t he e, the a t to o e a k. The fa t that e get the majority of referral here from friends and family members of past clients is testimony to the fa t the a e app e iati g hat the get he the o e he e i te ie ith u e t Pathways manager, 9 July 2009) In Pathways, then, the performance of organisational and individual theo-ethical approaches by staff and volunteers stood between unemployed clients and the technologies designed to govern them according to particular political rationalities. This approach was formed when Pathways was established outside of any contractual partnership with government, and it was continued within the machinery of collaboration, where spaces of resistance were opened up even within contracted workfare environments. The approach continues at a smaller scale now that state funding has diminished. This journey of outsider/insider/outsider status has by no means defined the rationalities concerned; indeed, this illustration indicates the futility of any sharp distinction between insider and outsider organisations in terms of their capacity to shape, as well as be shaped by, the wider neoliberal political environment. This illustration does not suggest that contractual partnership imposes no restrictions on agency, or indeed that the participation of faith-based organisations can be counted on to bring about normative or even consistent performances of care. It does, however, indicate that locally situated activities and agencies do co-constitute grander-scale rationalities, and that the technologies deployed in pursuit of these rationalities can be subverted by the practice of particular ethical precepts and affects, thus confirming that the performative assemblage of neoliberalism can be reshaped locally in such a way as to inculcate resistance and subversion.
7 Conclusion: faith and the co-constitutive enactment of and resistance to neoliberalism
These different strands of argument lead us to suggest not only that FBO activity represents more than a simple outworking of neoliberal governance of the city, but also that neoliberalism cannot be regarded as the principal driving force behind the revision of secularism so as to reinstate religion in the public realm. Indeed, any such framing of the power of neoliberalism takes insufficient account of how the secular inherently accommodates instituted forms of religion. That is, the religious and the secular should not be regarded as stand-alone categories, but rather as mutually constitutive both historically and in the contemporary provision of welfare and care in the city. For example, Smith , page a gues that the E lighte e t did ot ep ese t the start of the relentless march of atheis leadi g to a godless Weste so iet , ut athe it su de ed Ch istia ethi s f o Ch istia doctrine, so that the technologies of science were liberated from divine law but politically remained
Christian in values. As a consequence, 18th-century Christian theology imbued the secular values of universal egalitarianism, the ethos of teleological progress through the nation-state and Lockean liberalism (demarcating the public and private life of the citizen), to the extent that European U i e salisti egalita ia is , f o hi h sp a g the ideals of f eedo a d a olle ti e life i solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Ch istia ethi of lo e.
Equally, the postwar welfare state, which many herald as the birth of secular welfare, was largely built from the values of Christian philanthropists who pioneered many welfare initiatives in the absence of state activity (Brenton, 1985; Farnell et al, 1994, pages 34-37; Harris, 1995; Prochaska, 2006 , Whelan, 1996 . Once the welfare state was created, faith groups shifted their direct action to helping those most in need who fell underneath the safety net (Prochaska, 2006) . This is evident in the longstanding Likewise, neoliberalism has not simply brought about a new form of secularism-one that instrumentally incorporates religion rather than excludes it from the public realm (Dias and Beaumont 2010) -but rather that we are witnessing the latest phase of a co-constitutive dynamic between religion and secularism. Faith both enacts neoliberal formations and embodies resistance to them, and it will be tracing these practices and moments of enactment and subversion that will lead to a more nuanced understanding of the FBO phenomenon in the contemporary city.
The e a e a u e of a s i hi h faith has ee ought i to eoli eral formations, shaping and ei g shaped the eoli e al state s se ula ist self-u de sta di g De V ies, , page a d accommodating the voices of faith groups in the public realm (Baird, 2000; Dias and Beaumont, 2010) . (Cloke, 2010; 2011) , the hopeful imaginations derived from these beliefs-in-action that can provide a shared counternarrative (Hackworth, 2007) against the hegemony of neoliberal politics.
In these ways, the interconnections between faith, secularism, and neoliberalism are much more fragmented and variegated than has been argued elsewhere. The ethical agency of organisations and individuals involved in the FBO sector cannot simply be circumscribed by the structures and technologies of neoliberal government, and the connection of religion to contemporary capitalism defies straightforward characterisation as simply a legitimising force complicit in the powers that be.
Rather, the ambiguous and contingent entanglement of faith groups working in neoliberal structures reveals specific points of resonance where neoliberalism and faith converge to coproduce neoliberal forms, and dissonance where faith and neoliberalism diverge. Even within the contractual arena of neoliberal governance, the frontline performance of care can often be understood as a site of subversion. In coproducing neoliberal structures of welfare governance, the ethical performance of staff and volunteers in FBOs rework and reinterpret the values and judgments supposedly normalised in the regulatory frameworks of government policy, bringing alternative philosophies of care into play. 
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